The Tribune

Following the 20th anniversary of Britain’s handover of Hong Kong to China, Peter Young offers a personal view about developments . . .

IN VIEW of long-standing fears about the future of Hong Kong, the celebration earlier this month of the 20th anniversary of its handover by Britain to China was a significant milestone, and it was also noteworthy that President Xi Jinping participated in the local events to mark the occasion

In a speech which was seen as both tough and reassuring, he praised the government for maintaining stability and curbing ‘independence advocacy’ and he confirmed support for a continuation of the policy of ‘one country, two systems’. At the same time, in condemning publicly any activities that could be seen as threatening China’s sovereignty, he warned against separatist forces. He also oversaw the swearing-in of the new chief executive of the Hong Kong government who was Beijing’s preferred candidate.

Furthermore, in addition to the stationing in Hong Kong in 1997 of troops of the People’s Liberation Army, the largest military parade of the last twenty years took place and China’s new aircraft carrier sailed grandly in to Hong Kong harbour.

All this has come at a time of heightened tension, with many in Hong Kong concerned at what they perceive to be increasing lack of respect for their status as a Special Administrative Region.

Reportedly, younger people in particular fear that China is steadily restricting the territory’s responsibility for its own affairs with the result that democracy campaigners are ramping up their protests again following the massive street demonstrations of 2014. Political polarisation is apparently growing between the pro-Beijing local government and a pro-democracy faction so that the battle for full democracy and freedom may become almost the defining issue for the new Hong Kong.

This has in turn led to calls in the territory for Britain to live up to its purported responsibilities as the former colonial power which is still criticised by some for having, in their view, handed over a free city to a Communist tyranny and should live up to its residual obligation to ensure both the enhancement of democracy and protection of freedom in Hong Kong.

With a potential crisis brewing, it is interesting to look at the background to Hong Kong’s handover and how Britain approached the issue, not least because of the differences between policy-makers in London and the former Conservative government minister, Chris Patten, who was appointed Governor in 1992.

First, a look at the pre-1997 history. Parts of Hong Kong were ceded to Britain in perpetuity in the wake of the opium wars, but the majority of the land (some 90 per cent of the total) was leased in 1898 for a period of 99 years. The remaining area, which was held by grant, depended on the leased New Territories for food and water and was considered to be unviable on its own so that it would not be practicable or administratively feasible to hang on to this separately. Thus, the parts ceded and leased were integrated for the purposes of the Sino-British negotiations about Hong Kong’s future.

Fast forward to the 1970s and 80s, when the colony gradually developed a low-cost manufacturing base. Thanks to good governance, the rule of law and market economics, it was progressively transformed into a prosperous financial and commercial centre of global importance and a secure base for international investors wishing to do business in China. Finance and trade came first and there was little appetite for political reform until the 1990s when the citizens of Hong Kong became increasingly eager for change and a greater say in local politics.

Against this background, in fulfilment of its international obligations Britain negotiated with China the Joint Declaration of 1984. This detailed treaty sought to guarantee for fifty years from 1997 the way of life enjoyed in Hong Kong – that is, to retain its capitalist system, the rule of law and its autonomy in order to run its own affairs. Later, there was agreement about the number of directly elected seats to the Legislative Council and this was followed by a Basic Law which became Hong Kong’s mini-constitution after the handover. With China’s commitment to safeguard the territory’s freedoms and development, these accords served as the foundation of its confidence and prosperity in the intervening years.

In successfully securing China’s agreement, the sole criterion for Britain was the long-term welfare of Hong Kong’s more than seven million citizens. In order to protect that, British negotiators realised from the outset that they would have to convince the Chinese, who had the option of ultimately taking over the territory by force, that it was in their interests to have a smooth and orderly transfer of power – not least because, with its close ties to the southern mainland, Hong Kong’s service-oriented economy formed about one-fifth of China’s national economy. Thus, the argument went, it was better for everybody to have an agreed political settlement as China launched itself on the road to becoming a global economic powerhouse.

The intensive and tough talks were a real test of the skills of the officials concerned at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London. I recall occupying an adjoining office at the time, dealing with policy on the Falkland Islands following the conflict with Argentina in 1982, and everybody was aware of the difficulty and importance of the Hong Kong negotiations.

Meanwhile, China made it clear that it could go no further than the Joint Declaration and warned against any subsequent unilateral tampering with it. Public opinion in Britain was affected by the Tiananmen Square killings in 1989, but the main concern was the possibility, in the long run-up to the handover, of Beijing interfering with Hong Kong’s political and economic structures.

Then, the new Governor of Hong Kong arrived on the scene. As a politician, Patten adopted a more assertive approach than diplomacy dictated and pressed unilaterally for instant social and democratic reforms and full enfranchisement. Inevitably, the Chinese objected to his plans and there was a danger of the agreed arrangements for the handover falling apart.

The objective of the British negotiators was to preserve the structures, freedom and unique aspects of Hong Kong while avoiding confrontation at a time when China was in a position to impose its wishes whenever it was ready to do so. The new Governor’s activities were seen as potentially undermining the Joint Declaration and therefore unnecessarily provocative, damaging and counterproductive, though critics who favoured his approach had also accused the negotiators of the Joint Declaration of being too willing to compromise.

As a co-signatory of the Joint Declaration, Britain is committed to monitoring implementation of its terms. Following the 20th anniversary, officials in Beijing are on the record as stating that this bilateral treaty has become redundant and that the UK has no sovereignty or power in relation to Hong Kong after the handover. But, even though China is firmly in control, it is probably not in its interests to close Hong Kong down given the territory’s economic success and close business links to the mainland.

Nonetheless, Britain has now publicly reasserted that its commitment to Hong Kong, enshrined in the Joint Declaration which is legally binding, is as strong as it was twenty years ago.

While China has increasingly made it clear that it will not accept any intervention, it remains to be seen what action, if any, the UK might be able to take in order to protect Hong Kong’s future if there were any serious breach of the Joint Declaration.

While it is incumbent on Britain to defend robustly what it signed up to, China holds the trump cards so realpolitik requires in this instance a degree of conciliation. In the words of Dr Henry Kissinger, during any negotiation the prudent course is moderation and conciliation unless ‘the weaker is in a position to make its defeat costly beyond the tolerance of the former’.

More prosaically, as Lord Patten reveals in his book about his governorship entitled ‘East and West’, the blunt advice given to him by the bluff former Labour prime minister Lord Callaghan was that the British interest was simple – to make sure their businessmen could do a lot of trade with China. As he expressed it, the Chinese would do whatever they wanted after the handover and, realistically, Britain could do little about it. An oversimplification, perhaps, but uncomfortably near to the brutal truth.