By RASHAD ROLLE

Tribune Staff Reporter

rrolle@tribunemedia.net

A NEAR mid-air collision between two planes at the Lynden Pindling International Airport in September resulted in the suspension of a pilot and an air traffic controller, a new report by the Air Accident Investigation Department details.

Two planes simultaneously departed the same runway around 7am on September 22, 2018. It is not clear how close the planes came to contact, but investigators said the seriousness of two planes heading towards one another from opposite ends of the same runway “cannot be understated”. 

One of the planes, a C6-JEF Piper Aztec, was operated and owned by a 53-year-old private operator. It was headed to the Berry Islands with just the pilot onboard. The other aircraft, a Western Air turbo-prob aircraft, C6-KID, was headed to Grand Bahama with 25 passengers. 

The chief cause of the near collision was the C6-JEF pilot’s defiance of an air traffic control order –– the pilot departed from the wrong runway and later told investigators he forgot to follow the correct instructions despite previously acknowledging them. The crew of the plane carrying 25 people did not realise another aircraft had taken off towards them until it had passed directly overhead. Even though the pilot of the C6-JEF failed to obey air traffic control orders, it is “still incumbent on all pilots entering an active runway to be cognizant and vigilant of traffic that may be crossing a runway, exiting a runway or in this case departing from a runway,” investigators emphasized. 

The AAID said: “The poor decision making exercised by the pilot of aircraft C6-JEF in not following directions by ATC, despite advising he understood the instructions given, has been determined as the probable cause of the near mid-air collision; also contributing to this near mid-air collision was the actions of the air traffic controller by losing visual on the aircraft he issued instructions to, and the failure on the part of the crew of C6-KID for not observing that another aircraft was on the same runway at the same time before commencing their take-off roll; the AAID believes this loss of visual contact on the aircraft by the controller may have been as a result of distraction due to the ongoing shift change at the time, and the fact that the controller was manning two separate radio frequencies during a time of high traffic volume while using a system that required additional training and frequent data input so that all systems can function properly with adequate current information.

“The AAID also believes the failure to notice the aircraft by the crew of C6-KID may be the result of distractions or preoccupation with completing final checks while on the runway, before takeoff; pilot training, qualification and air traffic controller training, licensing and record keeping practices have been investigated and while not directly contributing to the incident, were noteworthy and required action.”

The AAID found that the air traffic controller had an expired medical certificate and no ATC licence. It found that the Bahamas Air Navigation Services Division (BANSD) lacked a documented process to track the medical status of air traffic controllers, that no ATC personnel had required ATC licences and that several ATC personnel were operating without the required current medical certificates.

On October 8, 2018, the BANSD formed a three-member internal review board to review the incident. The board concluded the primary reason for the incident was the wrong action taken by the pilot of CJ-JEF, but it also concluded that the controller contributed to the incident. The board drafted 14 recommendations to address “systemic internal deficiencies” within the air traffic system, but those sensitive recommendations were not included in the AAID report.

The AAID asked the Bahamas Civil Aviation Authority to re-examine the C6-JEF pilot “for his competence to hold a Bahamas issued pilot licence.” It also recommended that the pilot be re-assessed for medical fitness. The pilot was re-examined and while the results of his pilot test were satisfactory, his licence was suspended pending a medical assessment. There were issues concerning his medical capacity.

The AAID also recommended that controllers face more frequent and structured refresher classes, noting the controller involved in the incident underwent no refresher course since 2007. The controller was subsequently removed from active duty and underwent re-qualification training. He was then subjected to a period of supervised oversight. The AAID recommended that BANSD address its manpower shortage issues. 

By the time the investigation report was finalised, the BANSD had still not ensured ATC personnel had required licences, nor was any process of record keeping or tracking provided to address identified shortcomings, the AAID said.