The Tribune

Having maintained a strict zero- COVID policy for almost three years, the Chinese government had become a prisoner of it. The strategy was designed to address the low vaccination rates of the elderly population (80 million people aged 80+ years are not vaccinated and 44% of the population did not receive the third dose, this percentage rising to 60% among people aged 80+ years). And, although studies in Hong Kong comparing CoronaVac with BioNTech’s vaccine have not been conclusive, the Chinese government did not seem to have much confidence in the degree of immunity provided by their own vaccines.

Authorities in Beijing feared that relaxing the strict COVID rules would lead to a significant increase in the number of deaths, with some estimations pointing at more than a million fatalities in the short term, and a huge number of admissions of patients with COVID that could congest hospitals (the number of beds in ICUs in Chinese hospitals is lower than in the West). Despite the World Health Organization having publicly declared the COVID-zero policy as unsustainable, the fact is that until the 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC), in October of this year, political priorities remained unchanged.

After the popular uprising against the endless zero-COVID policy, in late November, and with economic stability at stake, the Chinese government realized that it needed to revise policies, albeit without saying so clearly. On December 7, a ten-point plan was approved, giving freedom to provincial authorities in how to deal with COVID. This led to reductions in quarantine periods and a more rational and focused application of lockdowns and mass testing. Another significant change was the downgrading of the condition, from infectious disease A to B.

The Chinese government’s decision to, in practice, end the COVID-zero policy, will allow it to relaunch economic growth. However, the move entails obvious social and health risks, as stems from data on unvaccinated elderly people or without a first booster dose, as well as the limited ICU bed capacity in hospitals.

This policy change contains important lessons. In the Chinese Party-State, all leaders - whether at state, provincial or public company level - know that decisions triggering serious disruptions of public order and social stability can have serious consequences, especially for the decision makers. In this case, with demonstrations taking place spontaneously in numerous cities in China, it was clear that the responsibility did not lie with local or provincial authorities.

China was the only country left in the world with a zero-covid policy, and the resentment of the population, after crowds of unmasked football fans in Qatar were shown on TV, was approaching dangerous levels. Against this background, the CCP leadership was forced to react, completely changing course to preserve political and social stability, and avoid losing authority.

Despite the removal of leaders like Li Keqiang, who symbolised the primacy of economic growth, the new Party leadership proved to be attentive and quickly reversed course, before the slowdown of the Chinese economy triggered a recession. Such a scenario would have called into question the pact underlying the CCP’s Mandate of Heaven (reduction of the sphere of political and civil rights in return for economic growth and individual prosperity), threatening the very foundations of the regime.