By PAVEL BAILEY
Tribune Staff Reporter
pbailey@tribunemedia.net
THE Court of Appeal refused to grant the government leave to appeal to the Privy Council after the courts found that a former police officer was entitled to damages because he was wrongfully arrested and detained by his colleagues in 2016.
Former Sergeant Theodore Neilly expressed support for Coalition of Independents Deputy Leader Maria Daxon at the Central Detective Unit on September 1, 2016, shortly after she was arrested for allegedly defaming Assistant Commissioner Leon Bethell and Commissioner of Police Ellison Greenslade.
A colleague overheard Sgt Neilly call for the release of Ms Daxon and claimed that he said, “No justice, no peace.”
Sgt Neilly was called back to work by then Chief Superintendent Clayton Fernander and questioned about his remarks.
Sgt Neilly was told that he had to see Commissioner Greenslade at police headquarters, but was denied the right to drive there in his personal car.
Then Chief Superintendent Fernander reportedly instructed inspectors Alexis Roberts and Michael Johnson to take Sgt Neilly to police headquarters in an unmarked police Jeep.
In his civil suit against the force, Sgt Neilly successfully argued that he was taken to police headquarters against his will in seating reserved for prisoners and that he was not told why he was going there.
The Supreme Court awarded him damages, but the Court of Appeal ordered that only nominal damages be assessed.
In its latest appeal attempt, the government submitted that the Court of Appeal erred in judging that Sgt Neilly was unlawfully detained when CSP Fernander ordered him to accompany him to police headquarters to meet the commissioner.
The appellants also submitted that the Court of Appeal erred in not finding that Sgt Neilly, as an officer of the RBPF, had a duty to comply with lawful orders.
Court of Appeal Justice Indra Charles found that the submissions in the appeal were never argued during the trial or in a previous appeal.
She wrote: “In the exercise of our discretion, leave should not be granted to appeal to the Privy Council unless it can be demonstrated that there is an arguable case to succeed on appeal and that the appeal involves a point of general public importance.”
“The issues sought to be argued as a basis for granting leave to appeal were never canvassed before the trial judge or before this court. Further, none of the issues raised are issues of general public importance. More importantly, the issues were not pleaded and never argued before the trial judge or this court. Put differently, these issues are being raised for the first time.”
While Sir Arthur Barnett found that the current appeal raised no matter of general public importance that warranted a case before the Privy Council, he also said that the applicants could appeal directly to the apex court.
“The obligation of a subordinate officer to obey the order of his superior and the scope of that obligation was never the issue before the court below or this court,” he said. “If that was the point of law, the applicants wish to have determined by the Privy Council, this is not the case for the determination of that issue.”
“No doubt, if the applicants still wish to pursue the matter, they are always at liberty to apply directly to the Privy Council for leave to appeal, and the Board will itself consider whether the proposal appeal raises a point of general public importance that warrants its consideration on the facts of this case.”
K Melvin Munroe represented Sgt Neilly.
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