The Tribune

By RASHAD ROLLE

Tribune News Editor

rrolle@tribunemedia.net

THE Court of Appeal has overturned a Supreme Court judge’s decision to allow two women convicted of attempted murder to remain on bail pending sentencing, finding that the judge failed to explain why bail was justified after their convictions for serious offences.

Glenresha Williams and Michelle Williams were remanded into custody after the appellate court allowed an appeal by the Director of Public Prosecutions, ruling that the continuation of bail could not stand without a clear and lawful basis.

The written reasons for the decisionm said Justice Renae McKay did not show that she had formed the view that the women would receive a non-custodial sentence, a key requirement under section 3(1)(d) of the Bail Act when bail is granted after conviction and before sentencing.

The ruling marks a sharp rebuke of the handling of the bail decision in the Supreme Court, where the women were allowed to remain on bail even after a jury found them guilty of two counts of attempted murder.

The women were charged on October 28, 2021 with two counts of attempted murder and two counts of possession of a firearm. The charges stemmed from allegations that, while concerned together and with another person, they tried to kill Adrian Cooper and Savannah Bain and possessed a firearm with intent to endanger their lives.

Their trial began on October 27, 2025 before Justice McKay. On November 21, 2025, a nine-member jury convicted both women of two counts of attempted murder by an eight-to-one majority verdict.

After the verdict, Justice McKay continued their pretrial bail pending sentencing, which was then set for January 27, 2026. She varied their conditions to require electronic monitoring devices, a 9pm to 6am daily curfew, reporting to Fox Hill Police Station before 6pm on Mondays, Thursdays and Saturdays, no direct or indirect contact with prosecution witnesses, and the surrender of travel documents.

The DPP’s office immediately objected. Prosecutor T’Shura Ambrose told the court the Crown strongly opposed bail continuing because the women had been convicted and, given the seriousness of the offences, might abscond.

Defence counsel opposed the Crown’s position, arguing that the court had discretion to continue bail and that the women’s history did not support fears they would abscond.

Justice McKay referred in court to the Court of Appeal’s decision in the Don Brennen case, noting that in that matter she had continued pretrial bail after Brennen was convicted of manslaughter and the Court of Appeal upheld her decision.

However, the appellate court found that reliance on Don Brennen was misplaced because the circumstances were materially different. The Crown argued that Brennen involved exceptional health-related circumstances, noting that he was a 64-year-old man with health challenges, including a hearing deficiency. By contrast, the Court of Appeal said there was no evidence before Justice McKay of any medical condition or other personal circumstance warranting bail for the Williams women after their attempted murder convictions.

The DPP filed a notice of appeal on November 24 2025, arguing that Justice McKay “exercised her discretion wrongly in granting bail pending sentencing.”

The Court of Appeal agreed.

Justice Turner said the court’s role was not to decide whether it would have granted bail itself, but to determine whether the trial judge properly exercised her discretion. He noted that appellate courts generally interfere only where there is an error of law, an unreasonable exercise of discretion, or a failure to consider relevant factors.

The court found that this threshold was met.

Although Justice McKay considered the evidence, the law and Don Brennen, the Court of Appeal said she “failed to explain how those considerations justified her decision in the continuation of bail.” As a result, the appellate court said it could not determine the basis on which her discretion was exercised.

The judgment also stressed that once a person is convicted, the presumption of innocence no longer operates in that person’s favour. The Court of Appeal relied on the Earl Randolph Fraser case, which distinguished the principles governing pretrial bail from those that apply after conviction.

In that case, the court said a person not yet tried and convicted may rely on the presumption of innocence when seeking bail, but “where he is already convicted, the presumption of innocence falls away and the applicant can no longer rely on that as a factor weighing in his favour.”

The DPP’s office also argued that attempted murder is an offence that ordinarily warrants a custodial sentence, and that allowing bail in these circumstances would “open the floodgates” by creating an expectation that people convicted of offences could automatically remain on bail while awaiting sentencing.

Counsel for the respondents argued that post-conviction bail was not prohibited and that Justice McKay properly balanced the women’s liberty against public interest concerns. The defence also said the women had complied with their bail conditions and attended court throughout the proceedings.

But the Court of Appeal found that compliance with bail conditions and tighter restrictions were not enough.

“The variation of bail conditions and the Respondents’ compliance with those conditions, were insufficient to justify the continuation of bail following convictions of attempted murder,” the judgment said.

The court also rejected the argument that it was premature to determine whether a custodial sentence would be imposed because sentencing reports had not yet been received. Section 3(1)(d) of the Bail Act allows bail after conviction where a case is adjourned for inquiries or reports only if the court does not intend to impose a custodial sentence. The Court of Appeal found there was nothing in the record showing Justice McKay had reached that view.